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Abstract
Traditionally, many arguments for realism about properties (universals or tropes) rely 
on a priori claims. The author argues that if we make use of an abductive principle that 
is commonly employed by scientific realists, a new argument for property realism can 
be formulated which is based firmly in scientific practice. The abductive principle says 
that we should believe in the existence of certain theoretical entities if they figure in 
the best explanation for what scientists observe. The scientific argument for property 
realism then says (roughly) that the best explanation for various behavioural patterns 
that physical scientists observe is that microscopic entities (such as electrons) instan-
tiate stable, causally efficacious properties. After presenting the argument, the author 
defends it against possible objections. More generally, the article provides a case study 
for how science and metaphysics can work together to generate ontological claims.
Keywords
scientific realism – properties – causation – abduction – inference to the best 
explanation
1 Introduction: Scientific Realism, Scientific Properties and 
Abduction
Scientific realists believe in the mind-independent existence of many of the 
unobservables that we find in scientific theory. A common argument for this 
view, and perhaps the central argument for this view, relies on an abductive 
principle, which says that we should believe in the existence of an entity, or 
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type of entity, if it figures in the best explanation for the observable phenome-
na. With this principle in place, the scientific realists argue that various theo-
retical entities do indeed figure in the best explanation for the phenomena 
observed by scientists. In particular, scientific realists tend to posit the exis-
tence of physical entities. For instance, it is argued that we are entitled to be-
lieve in the existence of particles like electrons and quarks because the exis-
tence of such particles provides the best explanation for the fact that, in certain 
experimental contexts, the observable world behaves as if particles exist. Those 
who abductively infer the mind-independent existence of physical entities like 
particles are what Brian Ellis calls ‘scientific entity realists’, and its proponents 
include Smart (1963), Cartwright (1983), Devitt (1997) and Ellis himself (1987). 
Devitt (1997, 108) summarises the approach as follows:
The basic argument for the unobservable entities is simple. By supposing 
they exist, we can give good explanations of the behaviour and character-
istics of observed entities, behaviour and characteristics which would 
otherwise remain completely inexplicable.
Now, what is interesting to note is that an ontological commitment to the 
 entities posited by scientific realists, such as particles, does not automatically 
commit us to the fundamental existence of the properties had by those enti-
ties. We might say, for example, that a particle has properties like mass, charge, 
spin and so on, but the particle is not itself a property and it is an open ques-
tion as to whether the property ascriptions carry ontological commitment. 
 Using terminology from classical metaphysics, we might say that scientific 
 entity realists are realists about various substances.1 But as Ellis notes (1987, 50), 
one wonders whether the scientific realists’ abductive strategy could or should 
be applied to entities falling in other metaphysical categories, such as the theo-
retical properties described above. Consider again the Devitt quotation above 
(1997, 108). If we replace ‘unobservable entities’ with ‘unobservable proper-
ties’, perhaps we are left with a sketch of a promising science-based argument 
for  property realism: the basic argument for the unobservable properties  is 
 simple. By supposing they exist, we can give good explanations of the behaviour 
and characteristics of observed entities, behaviour and characteristics which 
would  otherwise remain completely inexplicable. Of course, in order to make 
such an argument we would still need a realist commitment to the entity 
1 I use the term ‘substance’ in a flexible way. I don’t mean to imply, for example, that scientific 
entity realists are committed to an Aristotelian theory of substance or a Lockean theory of 
unknowable substance.
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 realists’ physical substances, because it would be odd to be a realist about 
properties but not a realist about the bearers of those properties. However, the 
idea behind the abductive argument for scientific properties would be that to 
provide a good explanation for the full range of observable phenomena, we 
need to posit real properties as well as the bearers of those properties. Other-
wise, it is difficult to see how entities like electrons can deliver explanations in 
the way that entity realists suggest (more on this later). Such an argument 
would also provide a weapon against nominalist approaches to properties, 
which do not take properties to be ontologically fundamental, and would open 
the way for a robust realism about scientific theoretical properties.
The aim of this article is to explore how one might develop this abductive 
argument for realism about theoretical properties, such as charge, mass and 
spin. Since the role of these properties will be to help to causally explain vari-
ous behavioural patterns that we observe in science, they are what I shall call 
causally efficacious properties: properties which play specific causal roles.2 If a 
promising science-based abductive argument for such properties can be devel-
oped, this will be an important result for many different reasons – both from 
the perspective of the philosophy of science and metaphysics. On the philoso-
phy of science side, it is striking that many proponents of scientific entity real-
ism favour a nominalist (i.e. deflationist) approach to properties. For example, 
although Devitt is a staunch realist about unobservable property bearers, he 
leans in some of his work towards what Armstrong calls an ‘ostrich nominalist’ 
theory about properties (Devitt 1980). According to ostrich nominalism, predi-
cates carry no ontological commitment whatsoever, and those who ask for a 
metaphysical analysis of property talk, such as Armstrong (1978), can safely be 
ignored. Meanwhile, Smart leans towards a set nominalist view of properties, 
on which scientific predicates merely specify certain interesting sets of physi-
cal entities (1987, 184). It would be a striking result, therefore, if the form of 
argument that Devitt and Smart employ in the case of physical entities could 
also be applied to the theoretical properties had by those entities. This would 
show that the combination of scientific entity realism and nominalism about 
scientific properties is problematic – something that many prominent scien-
tific realists seem not to have noticed. In the other direction, it would also be 
welcome news in metaphysics that a science-based, abductive argument for 
2 It is tempting to call these ‘dispositional’ properties, but I have decided against using this 
terminology. The reason is that some people use the terms ‘dispositional properties’ and 
‘powers’ interchangeably. Hence, by expressing my argument in terms of dispositional prop-
erties, this might misleadingly suggest that my abductive argument is an argument for a pow-
ers theory of properties. As explained in the next section, the abductive argument presented 
in this article is compatible with both the categoricalist and powers theories of properties.
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realism about properties is available. Most prominent arguments for realism 
about properties have an a priori or unscientific flavour: they tend to be con-
ceptual, semantic, or based on the apparent need to analyse observable every-
day phenomena such as resemblance (see Armstrong 1978 and Lewis 1983 for 
surveys of metaphysical and semantic arguments for property realism). As 
such, scientific practice and theory have not always played a prominent role in 
arguments for property realism. Armstrong’s 1983 discussion of laws of nature 
in the context of property realism has a more scientific flavour, but many of the 
examples he uses concern macroscopic phenomena. Moreover, Armstrong’s 
argument relies heavily on the rejection of empiricist (Humean) theories of 
laws. Hence, it would be welcome news for realists if there was an argument for 
property realism that is based more squarely in scientific rather than meta-
physical considerations.
The argument that shall be developed in the following sections is antici-
pated by some brief comments by Brian Ellis (1987). As indicated above, Ellis 
suggests that the scientific realists’ abductive strategy might be applicable to 
entities other than physical entities like electrons and quarks. He refers to 
properties as a case in point (Ibid. pp. 65–67) but Ellis’s argument is sketchy. 
For example, Ellis provides little detail about what it is that theoretical proper-
ties are supposed to explain (Ibid. 57). And apart from a few passing comments 
about set nominalism (Ibid. 57), Ellis says little about why rival antirealist 
property theorists cannot themselves provide an adequate explanation for the 
patterns of observation we find in science. My aim in this article is to fill in 
the details and provide a point of departure for further discussions of abduc-
tive metaphysics and realism about various ontological categories. In particu-
lar, I shall argue that causally efficacious properties are needed to explain three 
kinds of observational pattern that are found in science.
2 The Scope of This Article
Before proceeding to the main argument, some clarifications about the scope 
of the article are in order. First, although I shall argue that a realist abductive 
inference is justified in the case of scientific properties, it is not the aim of this 
article to provide a defence of abductive inference in general. My main conclu-
sion is just that if one accepts abductive scientific arguments for theoreti-
cal property bearers such as particles, then one should also accept a parallel 
 abductive argument for realism about certain theoretical properties. For the 
purposes of this article, then, I shall simply assume that abduction is a legiti-
mate form of reasoning in some cases. I note that the scientific realists’ use of 
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abduction has been criticised by (among others) Hacking (1983, pp. 53–55) 
and  van Fraassen (1989, pp. 131–170), and I direct the reader to Devitt 1997, 
Ch. 7 and 8, for replies. For an excellent book-length treatment of inference to 
the best explanation, see Lipton (2004), and for recent discussions and defenc-
es of inference to the best explanation, see Mackonis (2013) and Dawes (2013). 
I shall also not say much about the distinction between observables and unob-
servables. There are reasons to think that this distinction is not sharp (see e.g. 
Hacking 1983, Ch. 10 and 11, for a discussion of borderline cases). For the pur-
poses of this article I shall assume that the properties we find in physics, such 
as charge and spin, qualify as unobservable phenomena but this assumption is 
not essential for the argument proposed.
Second, the article will not say much about the specific form of property 
realism that we should accept. As far as I can tell, the abductive argument to be 
discussed allows one to conclude only that some form of realism about proper-
ties should be accepted. Those familiar with the metaphysical literature on 
properties will know that property realism comes in many different flavours. 
For example, some realists think of properties as universals, which are repeat-
able and identical across their instances. In contrast, trope theorists insist that 
properties are non-repeatable abstract particulars, such that instances of a 
property are each distinct. Thus, according to most trope theorists, to say that 
two things share a common property is to say that those things possess distinct 
tropes that closely resemble (see Armstrong 1989 for a good introduction to the 
universals versus tropes debate). Again, the abductive argument for property 
realism is neutral as regards these realist in-house disputes. The universals or 
tropes that a substance instantiates are equally suitable for explaining the be-
haviours of their bearers. Indeed, as far as this article is concerned, we can also 
be open to the idea that the best metaphysical account of properties (realisti-
cally construed) is yet to be developed. For example, although Ellis (1987, 66) is 
attracted to the abductive argument for property realism, he is doubtful that 
existing realist views can provide a good account of the quantitative nature of 
scientific properties. Recently, Cowling (2014) has argued that a new ‘location-
ist’ theory of properties fares better in this regard, on which properties are 
points or regions in a real n-dimensional quality space.
There is also a lively contemporary debate about whether properties are 
fundamentally categorical or whether they are nothing more than powers. Ac-
cording to some property theorists, the causal dispositions of things are 
grounded in their categorical properties, where a categorical property is one 
that has a self-contained primitive essence (see e.g. Armstrong, 1997, Ch. 5). 
According to other property realists, properties have a powerful rather than 
categorical essence and therefore dispositions need not be grounded in a 
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 categorical base (see e.g. Bird 2007 and Mumford 2004). There are also property 
realists who think that the categoricalists and powers theorists are both par-
tially correct: properties are ‘powerful qualities’ and have both a categorical 
and powerful aspect to them (see e.g. Heil 2003, Ch. 11 and Engelhard 2010). 
Again, for the purposes of this article, we may remain neutral as to whether 
properties are fundamentally categorical, powerful or both. All that matters for 
our purposes is that the properties posited are causally efficacious, and indeed 
categoricalists, powers theorists and powerful qualities theorists all accept that 
the properties they posit are causally efficacious. On most categoricalist theo-
ries, for example, it is categorical properties that are ultimately responsible for 
the causal behaviours of things—in conjunction with the laws of nature—and 
dispositions are merely inert second-order properties of things: properties of 
having first-order (categorical) properties that play certain causal roles (e.g. 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson 1982). This is a thesis that McKitrick (2018, Ch. 9) 
calls the ‘Inert Dispositions Thesis’ and it is one that she argues against. If dis-
positions can be their own causal base, as McKitrick urges, this opens up the 
alternative possibility of properties being fundamentally powerful rather than 
categorical. The conclusions of this article are compatible with either out-
come. In sum, further metaphysical work is needed to establish whether the 
real causally efficacious properties are universals or tropes, or whether they are 
fundamentally categorical or powerful.3
Next, it must be acknowledged that this is by no means the first article to 
argue for properties based on causal considerations. It is common, particularly 
is the literature on tropes, to argue that ordinary causal claims are best inter-
preted in terms of a metaphysics of tropes (e.g. Campbell 1990 Ch. 5 and 1997, 
Ehring 2011 Ch. 3, Williams 1953). However, these arguments differ from the 
abductive strategy explored in this article. Those arguments for tropes typi-
cally proceed by examining the grammar of specific causal claims and showing 
that if we take such claims at face value, we should interpret the causal con-
nections involved as being between property instances of objects rather than 
objects taken in their entirety. Moreover, the examples typically involve macro-
scopic causation rather than theoretical cases in science. For example, Camp-
bell asks us to consider a case in which the weakness of the cable causes the 
bridge to collapse (1997, 129), or a case where the heat of a stove causes a burn 
to the finger (1990, pp. 22–23). Campbell urges that ‘the conditions referred to 
in these examples … are properties, but the specific particular cases of proper-
ties involved in particular causal interactions’ (1997, 129). Although that argu-
ment differs from the one presented in this article, there is no reason why the 
3 For what it’s worth, my view is that properties are Platonic universals (2013) and that they 
have a qualitative aspect to them as well as a powerful aspect (2012).
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two arguments could not work together to strengthen the overall case for prop-
erty realism. However, I would be reluctant to say that either argument favours 
trope theory over realism about universals. For example, as long as a realist 
about universals has a suitable notion of property instances in their theory, 
they can deal with Campbell’s causal examples just as well as trope theory – or 
so it seems to me.
In recent literature, work on properties and causation has taken a more 
 scientific approach. For example, there is a debate, initiated by powers theo-
rists, on whether the properties posited in theoretical science might favour re-
alism about fundamental powers. The thought is that because such properties 
(like charge and spin) are properties of simple particles, there is no sense in 
which such properties could have a categorical base. This is what Williams 
(2011) calls the ‘argument from science’ (see also Ellis 2001 Ch. 3, Molnar 2003, 
Mumford 2006, Bird 2007 and Hüttemann 2009). Williams himself argues that 
this argument is not conclusive and that, as far as science is concerned, funda-
mental particles might have a categorical aspect to them. I am inclined to agree 
with Williams on this point, but as far as this article is concerned we may re-
main neutral on this issue. As explained above, the aim of the abductive argu-
ment is to establish realism about causally efficacious theoretical properties. 
To repeat, whether or not these properties are categorical or powerful is a fur-
ther question that we shall not address.
A final clarification to make is that the abductive argument to be discussed 
only allows us to establish the existence of a limited set of properties, namely 
various theoretical properties in science that allow us to give a systematic ex-
planation for various experimental patterns that we observe. Thus, the abduc-
tive argument can only be used to establish a sparse, a posteriori version of 
property realism. The argument remains silent on whether there are also 
‘abundant’ non-scientific properties (see Lewis 1983 on the sparse/abundant 
distinction). That said, Devitt (1997, Ch. 5) has argued that abduction can be 
used to establish realism about ordinary observable objects (‘Common-Sense 
Realism’) as well as the unobservable objects of science. So, it might be that a 
parallel abductive move can be made to establish realism about observable 
macro-properties in addition to theoretical properties in science. Again, I shall 
leave this particular issue for future work.
3 The Abductive Argument in Outline
In Ellis’s 1987 he provides us with a sketch of an abductive argument for real-
ism about properties. After introducing the scientific realist abductive argu-
ment for the reality of particles, he writes (1987, 57):
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It is also, prima facie, an argument for the existence of certain properties, 
for example the properties that these particles are supposed to have. For, 
we may ask, ‘Why do the fundamental particles behave as if they had 
these properties?’ The only satisfactory answer seems to be: ‘because they 
actually do have these properties’.
Here Ellis identifies the two premises of an abductive argument for scientific 
properties. The first premise is that particles behave as if they have properties. 
The second premise is that the best explanation for this behaviour is that par-
ticles really do have these properties. These two premises then give us the 
 ingredients for the abductive inference that establishes the reality of the par-
ticles’ properties. As it stands, however, the argument is not very detailed. 
What does it mean to say that particles behave as if they have properties? Since 
we cannot directly observe fundamental particles, presumably such ‘behav-
iour’ will itself have to be inferred from the observable data that we yield from 
our scientific instruments. The important question, then, is this: what kinds of 
experimental observations make it appear as though particles have various 
properties as opposed to no properties at all? Until we have answered this 
question, it is not clear what the first premise commits us to, nor what its justi-
fication might be. The proposal I develop in the sections below is that this first 
premise is supported by three kinds of observational pattern in science: behav-
ioural similarity at a time, behavioural similarity over time, and the phenom-
enon of disposition clustering.
It is also not clear why the second premise supports the inference to realism 
about properties. For example, some nominalists might happily accept that 
particles have properties and that this explains why particles behave as if 
they have properties. Nominalists are typically deflationists about properties 
rather than eliminativists, and so they need not deny that things have proper-
ties (in some sense). Why then does our explanation of the particles’ behav-
iour require a commitment to realism about properties as opposed to some 
non-eliminativist form of nominalism? Although Ellis briefly discusses set 
nominalism (1987, 57), he says nothing about other popular forms of nominal-
ism, nor does he consider possible explanations for observable behaviour that 
do  not appeal to properties at all. We shall explore these issues further in 
 sections 7 and 8.
4 Behavioural Patterns and the Experimental Method
Let us proceed then by developing and defending the premises above in 
more detail. What does it mean to say that something is behaving as if it has 
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 properties? And more precisely, what kinds of experimental observations 
would lead us to think that theoretical entities are behaving as if they have 
properties? In order to approach these questions, it is helpful to begin by con-
sidering the nature of scientific experimentation itself. First and foremost, 
what systematic scientific experimentation reveals are patterns of behaviour 
in nature rather than singular, isolated causal events. In particular, there are 
three kinds of pattern that shall be discussed in the sections below, which are 
what I call patterns of differential similarity, uniformity, and disposition clus-
tering. What underlies all these patterns is the fact that physical entities have 
various behavioural dispositions to interact with other things in various ways, 
and when experimenting our aim is to manifest more and more of these dispo-
sitions so that we can formulate laws and draw inferences about what lies be-
hind this behaviour. But to be clear, to say that experiments reveal dispositions 
is not already to presuppose that there are real universals or tropes. As we shall 
see later in sections 7 and 8, there are theories which take dispositions meta-
physically seriously but which offer a nominalist analysis of properties. As we 
shall understand the term, to say that something has a disposition is just to say 
that a certain subjunctive/counterfactual truth holds of it. Whether or not real 
properties (universals or tropes) are the source of those truths is a further 
question. The conclusion will be, of course, that real properties are indeed 
needed.
When one reflects on the preconditions of fundamental scientific enquiry, 
it is no surprise that the experimental method is restricted to telling us about 
the behavioural patterns in the world. When our enquiries about the world go 
beyond the realm of medium-sized dry goods, we can only rely on the help of 
experimental instruments. Such instruments allow us to causally interact at 
scales far beyond the reach of our perceptual capacities. This is not to say that 
our instruments give us direct epistemic access to the world at the microscopic 
or cosmic scales, because all our instruments can ultimately show us is how 
the world is disposed to interact with our instruments. If we were to alter the 
design of our instruments, then the causal consequences of our experiments 
might be different. So, the experimental data we gather says as much about our 
instruments as it does the world. In short, our observable experimental data 
only goes as far as showing us how the world and our instruments interact. If 
we want to move from knowledge of those interactions to knowledge about 
what the world is like in itself, this takes theoretical work, as the abductive 
strategy illustrates. Williams (2011, 77) sums up the situation nicely as follows:
We are restricted, as it were, to poking and prodding at them with bom-
bardments, and ‘seeing’ (through instruments) how they react. This in-
forms us about the reactions, responses, and outputs that the  fundamental 
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entities produce in response to testing; it tells us what behaviour the enti-
ties exhibit.
In summary, the experimental method delivers, and can only deliver, patterns 
of behaviour. Hence, from a scientific perspective, to say that some theoretical 
entity behaves as if it has properties is to say that certain patterns of behaviour 
are observable. What, then, are these patterns? What observable patterns give 
the appearance of there being properties as opposed to no properties at all? It 
is to this question that we now turn in the following three sections. In short, 
the answer is that properties can explain the following kinds of behavioural 
pattern: 1) behavioural similarity at a time (differential similarity); 2) behav-
ioural similarity over time (the uniformity of nature); and 3) what I call the 
phenomenon of disposition clustering. It is only when these behavioural pat-
terns arise that the abductive inference to real theoretical properties can and 
should be made. Let us now discuss each of these patterns in turn and explore 
how the abductive inference can be drawn in each case.
5 Differential Similarity in Behaviour
Suppose that, at a given time, two things that are otherwise distinct appear to 
behave in similar ways in similar circumstances. For example, imagine that we 
experiment with two particles in a laboratory, an electron and a muon. Sup-
pose also we do not know much about these particles, but find out through our 
instruments that they manifest different gravitational behaviour. On this basis, 
we naturally conclude that the two particles are not of the same kind. Howev-
er, suppose further that we discover the two particles manifest the same elec-
trostatic attraction or repulsion when in the presence of certain other matter. 
What inferences can be drawn from all of this? Well, this is a case in which the 
two particles are behaving as if they really are similar in some ways but not 
others. To be precise, the evidence suggests that they are similar in respect of 
charge but not in respect of mass. If that is right, then for the same reason 
that  the scientific entity realists accept the existence of particles, it seems 
we should accept the existence of ways or respects in which things can be be-
haviourally similar (or different). As per premise two of the abductive argu-
ment,  the reason is that these ways or respects of similarity provide the best 
explanation for why certain entities exhibit similar behaviour in some cases but 
not others.
Of course, the realists about properties can concede that our scientific ex-
planations of observable behaviour might not explicitly appeal to properties. 
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Being told that a certain particle manifests a certain electrostatic force because 
it is an electron might explain that behaviour in some sense. But it seems plau-
sible that such an explanation is informative only because electrons have the 
causally efficacious property of unit negative charge. If it is a precise, fine-
grained explanation of the electrostatic attraction or repulsion that we are 
looking for, it is plausibly the charge property which explains the electrostatic 
behaviour. The electron qua an entity with mass surely has no explanatory role 
to play here, because we know that particles with different masses can exhib-
it the very same electrostatic behaviour. Mass, then, plays a different causal- 
explanatory role, which is to explain gravitational or inertial behaviour. Given 
these explanatory roles, the argument from scientific realism suggests that it 
only makes sense to be a realist about entities if one is also a realist about prop-
erties. The inference is relatively simple: The scientific realists’ entities behave 
as if they are similar in some respects but not others. And the best explanation 
for this is that there really are ways in which those things are similar and ways 
in which they are different.
Importantly, the argument just outlined also satisfies a more general abduc-
tive principle that has been discussed by Schaffer in an article about Arm-
strong’s governing theory of laws.4 There, Schaffer proposes that our funda-
mental posits are only legitimate if they are not idle: they must do theoretical 
work for us (2016, 579 and 583). The argument of this section is precisely that 
property realism is justified in a scientific context because properties allow 
their possessors to make a differential causal contribution to the world. In-
deed, if entity realists posit entities which are not endowed with real, causally 
efficacious properties, it is difficult to see how they could satisfy Schaffer’s re-
quirement. In contrast, entities endowed with causally efficacious properties 
are certainly not idle, because if such properties exist, then the kinds of behav-
ioural pattern we find in the world are precisely what we should expect. As we 
shall now see, this point also holds in relation to patterns of uniformity and 
patterns of disposition clustering.
6 Consistency of Behaviour Over Time (the Uniformity of Nature)
The previous example of a behavioural pattern concerned distinct entities at a 
time. But the experimental method also reveals things about entities over time. 
In such a case, what we tend to see is that, if left untampered with, a physical 
entity will continue to exhibit the same behaviour (or in probabilistic cases, 
4 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this connection.
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similar statistical patterns of behaviour) in response to a given experimental 
set-up. For instance, if on one occasion a particle manifests a certain electro-
static attraction or repulsion when in the presence of certain other matter, we 
will typically find that if that same situation is replicated later on, the particle 
will exhibit the same electrostatic behaviour (as long as the particle has not 
been interfered with in the intervening period). Let us call this pattern of re-
peatability over time the uniformity of nature.
What can explain the uniformity of nature from a scientific realist perspec-
tive? As with the case of differential similarity at a time, it seems wholly natu-
ral to appeal to underlying causally efficacious properties out there in the 
world. The explanation for why the aforementioned particle behaves as if it 
has the same dispositions at different times is that it has a property which it 
keeps over time—regardless of whether we happen to be causally prodding 
that property. According to this explanation, the uniformity of nature rests on 
the fact that we live in a world of things with stable, causally efficacious prop-
erties that are not always made manifest to us. To return to the case above, the 
particle exhibits the same electrostatic dispositions on each occasion because 
it had a certain property on each occasion—namely a given charge. And the 
reason it had the charge on both occasions is that charge is a real, persisting 
feature that it keeps over time but which reveals itself only some of the time.
At this point, a critic might worry that such an explanation is trivial and 
uninformative. Saying that the particle was charged on both occasions might 
not seem to give a very illuminating explanation for the fact that the particle 
displayed the same electrostatic behaviour on those different occasions. This 
sort of worry could be raised for all three of the explanatory cases being dis-
cussed. Here, critics might point out that we have little conceptual grip on the 
nature of charge other than by reference to the fact that it causes electrostatic 
attraction. Indeed, the dictionary definition of charge seems to support this 
thought. Consider, for instance, the following characterisation of charge in the 
Oxford Dictionary of Physics (Isaacs, 2000):
Charge: A property of some elementary particles that gives rise to an in-
teraction between them and consequently to the host of material phe-
nomena described as electrical. … Two particles that have similar charges 
(both negative or both positive) interact by repelling each other.5
Clearly, in this entry charge is characterised as precisely that which helps to 
explain, or ‘give rise to’ various observable behaviours associated with certain 
5 I discovered this quotation in Mumford 2006, 476.
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elementary particles. One might therefore worry that saying that the charge 
property explains the electrostatic behaviour amounts to saying that the cause 
of F is the cause of F. But it is not illuminating to be told that the cause of F is 
what caused F, given that this claim is an analytic truth.
In response, I think we may agree that in science it is hard to see how we can 
define certain theoretical properties other than by reference to the experimen-
tal behaviour they give rise to. As we saw in section 4, we cannot directly ob-
serve the world at small or large scales, and so when doing science at those 
scales we can only posit entities by reference to the effects they have on our 
instruments. But does this mean that it is trivial to say that, say, an intrinsic 
charge property of a particle explains its electrostatic behaviour? It does not. 
Even if, from a scientific perspective, the charge explanation is akin to saying 
that the cause of F caused F, this does not rule out a genuine explanatory con-
nection. As Mumford remarks in a different context, it would be absurd to say 
that the cause of F could not cause F because the former proposition means 
the cause of F (2004, 169). That would be to conflate semantics and metaphys-
ics, and to mistakenly draw a metaphysical conclusion based on the way the 
cause is being picked out in the relevant proposition.
Returning to the charge explanation, we can also see that it is non-trivial, 
metaphysically speaking, when we reflect on the fact that there are other con-
ceivable metaphysical explanations for the repeatability of a particle’s behav-
iour, and we can even conceive of there being no explanation at all. This shows 
that the property realist explanation is not trivial. For instance, it seems logi-
cally possible that all fundamental entities such as particles are featureless 
blobs and that a powerful god somehow decrees that they will always behave 
in certain ways. In that case, the explanation for the repeatability of behaviour 
would have nothing to do with inherent properties of particles. Similarly, per-
haps one could appeal to external primitive laws of nature that somehow dic-
tate how featureless blobs are to affect our experimental instruments. Alterna-
tively, perhaps the behavioural regularity (or statistical regularity) that we find 
in the world is just a brute fact, and not to be explained by anything. Indeed, 
this is the position that Humean naïve regularity theorists about laws seem to 
hold, at least where fundamental regularities are concerned.
Before discussing a further explanatory need that arises in science, one final 
important point should be highlighted about the uniformity of nature. It is 
arguable that the uniformity of nature is an integral part of not only a scientific 
realist argument for properties but also for the existence of the things that 
have properties, such as atoms, electrons and so on. Without the uniformity of 
 nature, it is difficult to see how we could ever get a firm grip on the idea that 
our instruments detect mind-independent objects. Imagine, for instance, that 
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 although every experiment generated causal data, the uniformity of nature did 
not hold, so that the world’s behaviour changed radically from one moment to 
the next. In such a case, suppose that the same kinds of instrumental stimuli 
never gave rise to the same instrumental responses. If that were the case, 
we would surely begin to lose a grip on the idea that there were stable unob-
servable entities responsible for the instrumental effects. Unless such effects 
 occurred repeatedly and uniformly, the user of the instrument would surely 
have little reason to infer anything other than that the instrument behaves ran-
domly of its own accord. In short, it seems that the uniformity of nature is a 
necessary part of any scientific realist framework, such as that of Cartwright, 
Devitt and Smart discussed earlier. And importantly, if a plausible explanation 
for this uniformity requires us to posit stable, causally efficacious properties, 
which exist even when they are not manifested to us, then it seems a belief in 
such properties is necessary for the formation of any beliefs that reach beyond 
what is immediately observable. If this is right, then the scientific realist case 
for property realism is even stronger than Ellis himself may have realized. 
 Rescher (2000, 32) illustrates the point with the case of an apple (here he refers 
to unmanifested properties as ‘latent sectors’).
The existence of this latent sector is a crucial feature of our conception of 
a real thing. Neither in fact nor in thought can we ever put it away. To say 
of the apple that its only features are those it actually manifests is to run 
afoul of our conception of an apple. To deny—or even merely to refuse to 
be committed to the claim—that it would manifest particular features if 
certain conditions came about (for example, that it would have such-
and-such a taste if eaten) is to be driven to withdrawing the claim that it 
is an apple.
7 Patterns of Disposition Clustering
We now come to the final sort of behavioural pattern that cries out for explana-
tion. It is striking that in all branches of science, we find specific patterns in the 
way that determinate dispositions are distributed. Dispositions, to recall, relate 
to the subjunctive facts concerning an entity’s behaviour. In particular, our 
world contains many regularities in terms of how behavioural dispositions 
‘cluster’ around various physical entities. For instance, when a medium-sized 
object is spherical, it has the disposition to roll down a hill (in the presence of 
gravity) as well has the disposition to affect our visual capacities in a certain 
way (in the presence of certain lighting conditions).
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Now, we can often explain dispositions at non-fundamental levels of nature 
by appealing to reductive explanations at lower levels. For example, the dispo-
sition of a macroscopic object to reflect light in a certain way can be explained 
in terms of microscopic properties like molecular structures and their vibra-
tory behaviour. Hence, we might expect that disposition clustering at the 
 macro-level can always be explained by mechanisms at lower levels, so that the 
clustering patterns are no longer surprising. Matters are not quite so simple in 
the more fundamental sciences, however, because reductive explanations may 
not be available. And importantly, disposition clustering occurs in all areas of 
nature. Entities that are disposed to resist certain forces to certain degrees also 
have certain gravitational dispositions. Particles that have a disposition to un-
dergo a certain electrostatic force when in certain electric fields also have the 
disposition to undergo certain Lorentz forces when in certain magnetic fields. 
These are all different kinds of dispositions, since they have distinct triggering 
conditions and result in different kinds of observable behaviour. It is even the 
case that many dispositions of the same kind are regularly had by physical en-
tities. For instance, in the case of charge, we find that if a particle is disposed to 
experience a force of 3 dynes when in a field of 1 dyne per statcoulomb, it will 
also be disposed to experience a force of 6 dynes in a field of 2 dynes per stat-
coulomb.6 Indeed, a charged particle will have an infinite number of such dis-
positions, given that the laws concerning charge, such as Coulomb’s law, are 
functional. For our purposes, it is important to emphasize that each of these 
specific dispositions is distinct in the sense that they involve different trigger-
ing conditions and different behavioural manifestations.
Such cases of disposition clustering are pervasive across all domains of sci-
ence. Kistler (2012, 123) acknowledges this point and offers a range of examples 
including other cases from physics. For example, he points out that there is a 
range of dispositions associated with electrical conductivity, which manifest in 
current density as well as thermal conductivity (Ibid. pp. 122–123). Kistler also 
discusses iconic memory in cognitive psychology (Ibid. p. 123), instances of 
which always involve a range of distinct reporting dispositions. In chemistry, 
we find that acids regularly have the disposition to dissolve certain things, the 
power to burn, to taste sour, to react with metals, and so on.
How, then, are all of these correlations to be explained? As we saw earlier, 
there may be reductive mechanistic explanations in some cases, but this will 
6 This example is borrowed from previous work (Tugby 2016, section 4.6), where I appeal to the 
phenomenon of disposition clustering in an argument against the causal nominalist theory 
of properties (more on this later). Kistler (2012, 2020) also discusses the case of elementary 
charge in order to argue for a distinction between ‘powerful properties’ and dispositions.
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not always be the case, especially at the fundamental level of physics where 
there are plenty of examples of disposition clustering. In these cases it seems 
the only metaphysical explanation available is that the array of behavioural 
dispositions is explained by the presence of a small number of underlying 
properties, which serve to ground (at least in part) and unify the dispositions 
in question. For example: A natural explanation for a scientific realist is that a 
body has certain inertial and gravitational dispositions because it has a certain 
mass. A particle has electrostatic and Lorentz dispositions because it has a cer-
tain charge. And more specifically, the reason why a particle with the disposi-
tion to experience a force of 3 dynes in a field of 1 dyne per statcoulomb also 
has the disposition to feel a force of 6 dynes when in a field of 2 dynes per 
statcoulomb is that the particle in question has the determinate charge prop-
erty of 3 statcoulombs. In short, an important role that causally efficacious uni-
versals or tropes are well placed to play is that of helping to explain the regu-
larities we find in disposition clustering.
In line with the comments in section 2, properties are well placed to play 
this role regardless of whether they are fundamentally categorical or disposi-
tional. If the properties are categorical, the idea would be that the various dis-
positions of, say, a charged particle are unified by the fact that the particle in-
stantiates a determinate categorical charge quantity that falls under the laws 
associated with charge. If, in contrast, properties are fundamentally powerful 
then the account of disposition clustering would be along the lines of that pro-
posed by Ellis (2001) and Kistler (2012, 2020). According to Ellis, the various 
determinate dispositions associated with a property like charge, of which there 
are infinitely many, are called ‘behavioral dispositions’ (2001, 120), and these 
dispositions are all grounded in a single determinate dispositional property 
universal, such as the property of 3 statcoulombs. Kistler (2012, 2020) has a 
structurally similar view on which a single ‘powerful property’ underlies and 
unifies the associated ‘multi-track’ dispositions.
Finally, it is important to clarify that these arguments are not meant to 
 imply that scientists themselves should include the property realists’ explana-
tions as part of their physical theories, for such explanations fall squarely with-
in the remit of metaphysics. Moreover, we should not assume that all properties 
discussed in science can be used to unify multiple determinate dispositions in 
the way suggested. Perhaps, for example, there are some cases in which a prop-
erty term is used as ‘shorthand’ for conjunctions of more basic properties, each 
of which confers its own unique dispositions. This could be the case with 
‘mass’, since there is an ongoing debate about whether there are two kinds 
of mass, one giving rise to inertial dispositions and the other to gravitation-
al dispositions. Nonetheless, it seems plausible that in at least some cases of 
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disposition clustering, there is a unifying property which grounds the cluster. 
As  Kistler (2020, Sect 11.2) illustrates, this seems especially plausible in the case 
of elementary charge.
8 Objections Considered: Are Real Properties Worth the Price?
With the core abductive argument in place, let us conclude by considering 
some possible responses from those who resist property realism. As acknowl-
edged earlier, the abductive argument for properties would not be, and indeed 
has not been, accepted by all scientific realists. Although Smart is a well-known 
advocate of scientific entity realism, he admits that although he is attracted to 
property realism, he is doubtful ‘how to work it out’ (1987, p. 183). In particular, 
he notes that many properties in fundamental science are quantitative, where-
as realist views about properties tend to apply more naturally to qualitative 
properties. As a result, Smart is inclined to reduce properties to sets of individu-
als rather than to accept that properties exist in their own right (Ibid. p. 184).
In some ways I sympathise with this worry. Properties are metaphysically 
puzzling for a number of well-known reasons, relating, for example, to the is-
sue of instantiation and Bradley’s regress. But does the difficultly of providing 
a problem-free realist theory of properties provide a good reason for ruling out 
the existence of universals or tropes? I do not think so. I believe that what this 
article helps to show is that if one takes abductive scientific realism seriously 
then one should make an effort to develop a realist theory of properties, given 
the explanatory rewards that it promises.
Returning to Smart’s preferred approach, the main problem is that it is un-
clear how a deflationary set nominalist view of properties can do any explana-
tory work where behavioural patterns are concerned. As mentioned above, 
Smart leans towards a view on which properties merely pick out sets of things. 
On this view, to say that things share a certain scientific property is to say that 
those things naturally belong to the same set. Thus, propertyhood is reduced to 
the notion of set membership and naturalness. There are many well-known 
objections to this view (see e.g. Armstrong 1978, Ch. 4), such as the worry that 
the view puts the cart before the horse. Surely, things naturally belong to cer-
tain sets because of the properties they have rather than vice versa. I shall not 
discuss these objections here, however. For our purposes it suffices to point out 
that it is mysterious how set membership can help to explain the behavioural 
patterns that worldly objects exhibit. How can a set, which is an abstract group-
ing of objects, determine the behaviour of each of its members? It is difficult to 
see how such an explanation could work.
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To be fair to Smart, he was no doubt aware of the explanatory limitations of 
set nominalism and does not claim to be offering any deep explanations for 
worldly patterns of behaviour, which may explain why he later defends a ver-
sion of the regularity theory of laws (1993). This seems a surprising route for a 
scientific realist to take, however. Typically, the regularity theory goes hand in 
hand with empiricism. The regularity theory or some variant of it is pretty 
much unavoidable for full-blooded empiricists, given that they lack the re-
sources for going beyond what is observable, i.e. beyond the experimental 
regularities. However, given that Smart is a scientific realist, such a route is 
surely avoidable. And by not avoiding that route, Smart is left with a disjointed 
picture of the world. On the one hand, Smart is prepared to accept that entities 
like sub-atomic particles are fundamental existents because the world appears 
as if such particles exist. Yet, at the same time he denies that properties are 
fundamental existents, even though, as I have argued, the world behaves as if 
entities like particles possess some persisting, causally efficacious properties 
but not others. Given that scientific realists value explanatorily rich metaphys-
ical theories (unlike the empiricists), it is surprising that Smart does not em-
brace realism about properties.7
Could a more sophisticated version of set nominalism provide a more illu-
minating explanation for the patterns of behaviour discussed earlier? Interest-
ingly, in recent literature some powers theorists have seriously considered a 
nominalist variant of their view, namely, Whittle (2009) and McKitrick (2018, 
Ch. 2). Neither Whittle nor McKitrick endorse this form of nominalism whole-
heartedly; McKitrick’s dispositional pluralism allows that universals and tropes 
may still be needed in some contexts (2018, 99), while Whittle has endorsed a 
trope theory in other work (2008). Nonetheless, it is worth considering wheth-
er a nominalist version of the powers theory can deliver the sorts explanation 
that I have claimed are delivered by causally efficacious universals or tropes. 
Unfortunately, it is doubtful that it can.
The basic idea behind this recent form of nominalism is that ‘something 
having a power is a matter of an irreducible counterfactual holding of it’ 
 (McKitrick 2018, 98). On this view, there are irreducible counterfactuals/ 
subjunctive facts about what particulars can do, facts that are not grounded in 
universals or tropes that they instantiate. If one likes the idea that all natural 
properties are powers, one can then give a general account of natural proper-
ties in set- theoretical terms. We can say that some property is the set of par-
ticulars all of which share certain counterfactuals/subjunctives in common 
(Whittle 2009, 248). Importantly for our purposes, one might then think that 
7 As mentioned earlier, the same conclusion can be drawn with respect to Devitt’s work.
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these  irreducible counterfactuals could serve to explain the behaviours of 
things just as well as causally efficacious universals or tropes.
Unfortunately, the explanations delivered by power nominalism can only 
take us so far. While primitive counterfactuals/subjunctives might provide ex-
planations for behaviour in some of the examples considered earlier, they will 
not do so across the board. Consider, again, the case of charge discussed in the 
previous section. Charged entities have an infinite number of determinate dis-
positions, depending on which determinate value of charge they have. How-
ever, on the nominalist view we are considering each of these dispositions will 
correspond to a distinct primitive subjunctive fact, facts like ‘if the particle 
were in a field of 1 dyne per statcoulomb, then it would experience a force of 3 
dynes’ (Tugby 2016, 87). The problem is that the conjunction of all those dis-
tinct subjunctive facts remains unexplained: it turns out to be a brute fact that 
charged things have the array of dispositions that they do. In order to provide 
an explanation, one option is to appeal to governing laws of nature as a way of 
unifying the various subjunctives, but this would surely undermine the main 
motivations behind the powers theory, which is to provide a metaphysics that 
does without governing laws.8 In the light of this worry, the obvious alternative 
is to reject nominalism and accept that the relevant array of dispositions is uni-
fied and grounded by a determinate charge universal or trope.
Finally, can any other versions of nominalism do better when it comes to 
explaining the behavioural patterns that physical entities exhibit? I doubt it. 
The ostrich nominalism that Devitt defends in 1980 is simply not in the busi-
ness of explaining why certain predicates apply to some objects but not others. 
To say that a particle exhibits certain patterns of behaviour is precisely to pred-
icate certain features of it. But predication is primitive and goes unexplained 
on the ostrich nominalist approach. Resemblance nominalism is more ambi-
tious in its explanatory aims, since it tries to explain properties in terms of 
primitive relations of resemblance. And thanks to the work of Rodriguez-
Pereyra (2002), resemblance nominalism has made progress in responding 
to  its main objections. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how a resemblance 
nominalist can provide an explanation for the behavioural patterns discussed 
earlier that is better than the one provided by property realism. According to 
resemblance nominalism, to say that a set of things share the same property 
is to say that those things primitively resemble. But why, we may ask, should 
8 In previous work (Tugby 2016, 94) I discuss other reasons why a power nominalist should not 
accept a governing laws view. For example, the most obvious way of understanding a govern-
ing law is to view it is a relation between universals, but of course acceptance of universals 
would undermine power nominalism.
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the behavioural patterns exhibited by a particular particle have anything to 
do  with its relations of resemblance to other things? The problem here is 
 essentially the same as that facing set nominalism. Like set membership, re-
semblance is a relational property and it is difficult to see how a thing’s resem-
blance relations to other things should determine its intrinsic behaviour. 
Surely the dispositions of a particle would remain the same even if it didn’t 
happen to resemble anything else. The same goes for those versions of nomi-
nalism that make propertyhood mind-dependent, such as predicate or con-
cept nominalism. Imagine that minded creatures had not existed and there-
fore that the relevant predicates or concepts corresponding to the property of 
charge did not exist. Surely particles would still have engaged in electrostatic 
behaviour in the way that they do. This strongly suggests that those nominalist 
approaches cannot provide an explanation for the behavioural patterns that 
scientists observe.
9 Conclusions
The aim of this article has been to show that if one is attracted to the abductive 
approach to scientific entity realism, then one also has good prima facie rea-
sons for accepting property realism. Among other things, such properties help 
to remove the apparent coincidence of distinct dispositions regularly cluster-
ing together. Persisting mind-independent properties are also naturally in-
voked when explaining the uniformity of nature and the differential similari-
ties in behaviour of physical entities. In sum, I propose that by focusing on the 
aforementioned behavioural patterns—concerning differential similarity of 
behaviour, the uniformity of nature and disposition clustering—we can pro-
vide a detailed account of how and when a real theoretical property should 
reasonably be posited. This conclusion is striking for a number of reasons. In 
the philosophy of science literature, many scientific entity realists are not 
property realists, which suggests the parallels drawn in this article have gone 
unnoticed by many. And in the metaphysics literature, arguments for property 
realism tend to be based more on conceptual or semantic considerations. If 
the arguments of this article are sound, there is a more scientifically orientated 
argument for metaphysical realism about properties, one which deserves fur-
ther attention in future work on properties. Indeed, a broader lesson to draw 
from this article is that metaphysics can benefit from engagement with scien-
tific practice. This is what scientific realists have been doing for a long time, but 
many of them have been too narrowly focused on what I have called property 
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bearers. It is time to investigate the application of science-based abductive ar-
guments to entities in other ontological categories.
 Acknowledgments
First, I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their very helpful 
comments and Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla. This article was first presented 
at the Nottingham Trent University philosophy research seminar. I would like 
to thank the organizer, Ben Curtis, and Greg Mason and other members of the 
audience. More recently, the article was presented at the 2019 Jornadas Rolan-
do Chuaqui Kettlun Philosophy of Science Conference, hosted by the Pontifi-
cal Catholic University of Chile, Santiago. I am grateful to the audience at that 
event and especially grateful to the organizer, José Tomas Alvarado, for funding 
my research visit in Santiago under project 1160001 (Fondecyt. Chile). Finally, 
I thank Olley Pearson and Peter Vickers for their comments on an early draft.
References
Armstrong, D. M. 1978. Universals and Scientific Realism (Vols. i and ii). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Armstrong, D. M. 1989. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Colorado: Westview 
Press.
Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Bird, Alexander 2007. Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press.
Campbell, Keith 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Blackwell.
Campbell, Keith 1997. “The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars.” In: Properties, edited 
by D. H. Mellor & Alex Oliver, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 125–139. Originality 
published in 1981, Midwest Studies in Philosophy iv, 477–88.
Cartwright, Nancy 1983. How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cowling, Sam 2014. “Instantiation as Location.” Philosophical Studies 167, 667–682. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0120-z.
Dawes, Gregory W. 2013. “Belief is Not the Issue: A Defence of Inference to the Best 
Explanation.” Ratio 26, 62–78. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2012.00537.x.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/06/2020 08:02:26AM
via free access
Matthew Tugby
<UN>
22
10.1163/18756735-000112 | grazer philosophische studien (2020) 1-23
Devitt, Michael 1980. “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’?” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly 61, 433–9. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1980.tb00031.x.
Devitt, Michael 1997. Realism and Truth (2nd edn.). Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press.
Ehring, Douglas 2011. Tropes: Properties, Objects and Mental Causation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Ellis, Brian 1987. “The Ontology of Scientific Realism.” In: Metaphysics and Morality: 
Essays in Honour of J. J. C. Smart, edited by Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean 
 Norman, Oxford: Blackwell, 50–70.
Ellis, Brian 2001. Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Engelhard, Kristina 2010. “Categories and the Ontology of Powers: A Vindication of the 
Identity Theory of Powers.” In: The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and their 
Manifestations, edited by Anna Marmodoro, Abingdon: Routledge, 41–57.
Hacking, Ian 1983. Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy 
of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Heil, John 2003. From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hüttemann, Andreas 2009. “Dispositions in Physics.” In: Debating Dispositions: Issues in 
Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Mind, edited by Gregor Damschen, 
Robert Schnepf & Karsten R. Stüber, Berlin: de Gruyter, 223–237.
Isaacs, Alan (ed.) 2000. Oxford Dictionary of Physics (4th edn.). Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Kistler, Max 2012. “Powerful Properties and the Causal Basis of Dispositions.” In: Prop-
erties, Powers and Structures, edited by Alexander Bird, Brian Ellis & Howard San-
key, Abingdon: Routledge, 119–138.
Kistler, Max 2020. “Powers, Dispositions and Laws of Nature.” In: Dispositionalism: 
 Perspectives from Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, edited by Anne Sophie 
Meincke, Springer International Publishing, 171–188.
Lewis, David 1983. “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” Australasian Journal of 
 Philosophy 61, 343–277. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048408312341131.
Lipton, Peter 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation 2nd edn. Abingdon: Routledge.
Mackonis, Adolfas 2013. “Inference to the Best Explanation, Coherence and Other 
 Explanatory Virtues.” Synthese 190, 975–995. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011 
-0054-y.
McKitrick, Jennifer 2018. Dispositional Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Molnar, George 2003. Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, (Ed. S. Mumford). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Mumford, Stephen 2004. Laws in Nature. London: Routledge.
Mumford, Stephen 2006. “The Ungrounded Argument.” Synthese 149, 471–489. doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-0570-8.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/06/2020 08:02:26AM
via free access
 23Abduction And The Scientific Realist Case For Properties
<UN>
grazer philosophische studien (2020) 1-23 | 10.1163/18756735-000112
Prior, Elizabeth, Pargetter, Robert & Jackson, Frank 1982. “Three Theses about Disposi-
tions.” American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 251–257.
Rescher, Nicholas 2000. Nature and Understanding: The Metaphysics and Method of 
 Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo 2002. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem 
of Universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schaffer, Jonathan 2016. “It is the Business of Laws to Govern.” dialectica 70, 577–588. 
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12165.
Smart, J. J. C. 1963. Philosophy and Scientific Realism. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Smart, J. J. C. 1987. “Replies.” In: Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J. J. C. 
Smart, edited by Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan & Jean Norman, Oxford: Blackwell, 
173–195.
Smart, J. J. C. 1993. “Laws of Nature as a Species of Regularities.” In: Ontology, Causali-
ty,  and Mind: Essays on Honour of D. M. Armstrong, edited by John Bacon, Keith 
 Campbell, & Lloyd Reinhardt, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 152–168.
Tugby, Matthew 2012. “Rescuing Dispositionalism from the Ultimate Problem: Reply to 
Barker and Smart” Analysis 72, 723–731. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans112.
Tugby, Matthew 2013. “Platonic Dispositionalism.” Mind 122, 451–480. doi: https://doi 
.org/10.1093/mind/fzt071.
Tugby, Matthew 2016. “What are Dispositional Properties?” In: Reality Making, edited 
by Mark Jago, Oxford: Oxford University Press (Mind Occasional Series), 75–98.
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Whittle, Ann 2008. “A Functionalist Theory of Properties.” Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research 77, 59–82. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2008.00176.x.
Whittle, Ann. 2009. “Causal Nominalism.” In: Dispositions and Causes, edited by Toby 
Handfield, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 242–285.
Williams, Donald C. 1953. “On the Elements of Being ii.” Review of Metaphysics 7, 
171–192.
Williams, Neil E. 2011. “Dispositions and the Argument from Science.” Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 89, 71–90. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048400903527766.
Downloaded from Brill.com10/06/2020 08:02:26AM
via free access
